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Comments
The Civil Rights Potential of the Labor
Management Relations Act: The
Current Approach
I.

INTRODUCTION

The National Labor Relations Act' (Act) was enacted by Congress in
1935 to promote industrial peace through the regulation of employment relationships among employers, unions, and individuals. It has
been the principal labor law in this country for nearly forty years and
has twice 2 been amended to reflect Congressional intent to insure the
balance of power between business and labor, and to secure the rights
of individuals to engage in, or refrain from engaging in, collective
bargaining or other concerted activities for their own mutual aid and
protection.8
Interference with protected employee rights by employers or unions
has been expressly proscribed by section 8 of the Act. 4 It has long been
held that employees who engage in protests against their employer's
racially discriminatory policies are engaging in protected activities 5
within the meaning of the Act, and an employer who causes an adverse
effect on the employment status of employees engaged in such protests
commits an unfair labor practice. 6 Under such circumstances, however,
1. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1970),
formerly ch. 372, §§ 151-68, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) [hereinafter referred to as the Act.].
2. The Act was further supplemented by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). This section is commonly referred to as section 7 which
provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or
all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
4. Id. § 158. This section is commonly referred to as section 8. Employer unfair labor
practices are set forth in section 8(a) and union unfair labor practices in section 8(b).
5. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
6. Building Serv. Employees, 188 N.L.R.B. 141 (1971); Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co.,
179 N.L.R.B. 434 (1969); Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 148 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1964), remanded,
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the unlawful conduct is the employer's interference with the protest
7
and not its racially discriminatory policies.
Decisions of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) and several
circuit courts of appeals in the past decade have expanded the concept
of individual rights to include freedom from racially discriminatory
policies and practices by either employers or unions." Such policies or
practices by an employer have been held to constitute unfair labor
practices and have potentially established the Act as a bona fide antidiscrimination statute. 9 Recent developments in the law, however, may
have had a significant effect on the availability of the Act as a tool for
eliminating invidious discrimination on account of race or other protected classifications by an employer. 10
The potential of the Act as an anti-discrimination statute has developed concurrently with the enactment of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.11 The purpose of Title VII is to eliminate discrimination in employment on account of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. 12 It is an anomaly of sorts, that although the Act
preceded Title VII by nearly thirty years, it was not until Title VII became a reality that the civil rights potential of the Act was recognized.13
This comment will focus on the question of the legitimacy of the
Act as a civil rights statute. It will deal with the potential of the Act as
a vehicle for eliminating racial and other types of discrimination in
employment. This comment will discuss the rationale and applicability
of the major decisions and cases that indicate the trend of the law's
development. It will analyze the substance of the law, the jurisdiction
of the Board and the extent to which legal standards of other federal
laws are available in unfair labor practice issues grounded on discrim349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965), orig. decision aff'd, 166 N.L.R.B. 551 (1967), enforced, 419 F.2d
216 (9th Cir. 1969).
7. See also Leiken, The Current and Potential Equal Employment Role of the NLRB,
1971 DuKE L.J. 833, 865-66 [hereinafter cited as Leiken].
8. Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969), remanding sub
nora. Farmers Cooperative Compress, 169 N.L.R.B. 290 (1968); Local 12, United Rubber
Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 837 (1967); Local 1367, Int'l. l.ongshoreman's Ass'n., 148 N.L.R.B. 897, 1083 (1964),
enforced, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966); Independent Metal Workers Union, 147 N.L.R.B.
1573 (1964); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d
Cir. 1963). The National Labor Relations Board [hereinafter referred to as the Board]
is the enforcing agency of the Act.
9. See cases cited note 8 supra.
10. jubilee Mfg. Co., 82 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1973).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-15 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Title VII]. The sections
with which we are concerned are sections 701-16 of Title VII.
12. Id. § 2000e-2.
13. See cases cited note 8 supra.

Comments'
ination of the type proscribed by Title VII. In short, it will critically
evaluate the Board's role in an area of the law that has implicitly been
14
reserved for another governmental agency.
II.

THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION

The early cases dealing with discrimination in employment involved
labor unions. In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad,15 the
Supreme Court found a duty of fair representation 0 implicit in the
union's status as an exclusive bargaining representative under the Railway Labor Act.' 7 Acknowledging that a union may exercise their
statutory authority to represent in a manner which may have unfavorable effects on some of its members, the Court noted that such discrimination must be based on relevant considerations.' 8 Holding that
racial discrimination can never be a relevant consideration, the Court
concluded that the union had breached its duty under the Act by discriminating between groups or classes of employees within the bargaining unit because of their race.' 9 The Steele equal protection concept
was later adopted by the Court in several decisions 20 brought under
section 9(a) 2' of the Act.
For almost twenty years following these decisions the Board limited
its involvement in this area to withholding certain statutory protections from unions which engaged in discriminatory activities. Thus, a
union that failed in its duty to represent all of its members has had its
certification rescinded by the Board.22 Further, a discriminatory pro14. It is the author's contention that the enactment of Title VII expressed the will
of Congress that the elimination of discrimination in employment should be vested solely
in the agency expressly established for that purpose-the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission [hereinafter referred to as EEOC].
15. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
16. Id. at 203.
17. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970).
18. 323 U.S. at 203.
19. id.
20. Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330 (1953); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970). This section is commonly referred to as section 9. Section
9(a) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment ....
22. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Ill N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955); Hughes Tool Co., 104
N.L.R.B. 318 (1953); Larus & Bros. Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945). See Sovern, The National
Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 595 (1962) [here-
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vision in a contract was generally held to be no bar to a new election
under the Act's contract-bar rules. 2 3 These statutory privileges were
withheld on the theory that to extend federal protection in such in24
stances would violate the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution.
Until this past decade an employer's racially discriminatory conduct
was relatively safe from Board processes. It is well settled that an employer has no duty, of constitutional origin, that corresponds with the
duty of fair representation imposed on unions by the courts. 2 5 Therefore, since there was no statutory prohibition against racial discrimination by an employer until 1964,26 it was generally held that victims of
invidious and discriminatory practices had no direct remedy against
an employer. Nevertheless, discriminatory acts by an employer have
been collaterally involved as interferences with employees' section 7
rights under the Act in several isolated cases.2 7 The Board has also set

aside a representation election won by an employer who appealed to
the racial prejudices of its workers in pre-election propaganda.2 8 In
each of these cases, however, racial discrimination was considered only
in a collateral sense and was not held to be a direct violation of the Act.
III.

INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION AS AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE:

THE Miranda DOCTRINE

The Board's 1962 decision in Miranda Fuel Company,29 ushered in
a new concept of Board involvement in matters dealing with discrimination by both unions and employers on account of race, sex, and national origin. Subsequent cases 30 decided by both the Board and the

courts have established a rather dubious potential for the Act as a
bona fide civil rights statute.
inafter cited as Sovern]; Note, Applicability of Unfair Labor Practices to Racial Discrimination: Enforcement Under Civil Rights Act, 50 CORNELL L. REv. 321, 323-24 (1965).
23.

Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962).

24. Id. at 55 See also Leiken, supra note 7, at 838-42 for a discussion on the Constitutional basis of the duty of fair representation doctrine.
25. Boyce, Racial Discrimination and the National Labor Relations Act, 65 Nw. U.L.
Rvv. 232, 253 (1970); Leiken, supra note 7, at 863.
26. Title VII became effective July 1, 1964.
27. Richardson v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 242 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1957); Ozan Lumber, 42
N.L.R.B. 1073 (1942); American Cyanamid, 37 N.L.R.B. 578 (1942), as amended, 39
N.L.R.B. 1129 (1942).

28. Allen Morrison Sign Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962); Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66,
(1962). Racial appeals by unions have also invalidated elections. See NLRB v. Schapiro &
Whitehouse, Inc., 356 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1966).
29. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforce,,ent denied, 326 F.2d 172, (2d Cir. 1963).
30. See cases cited note 8 supra.

Comments
Miranda ironically enough, did not involve an issue of discrimination
because of race or sex, but the principles established therein have been
applied to such types of discrimination in subsequent cases. 81 Miranda
involved the case of a white truck driver who was placed at the bottom
of a seniority list by his employer at the request of the union pursuant
to the collective bargaining agreement which vested in the union the
administration of its seniority provisions.3 2 In a three to two decision,
the Board incorporated the equal protection-duty of fair representation concept 3 3 implicit in section 9(a) of the Act into section 7, and declared that a union that engages in unfair or irrelevant treatment of
its members, and an employer who participates with the union in such
activity, have committed unfair labor practices under section 8 of the
Act.34 Thus, for the first time, discriminatory conduct against members-employees based on irrelevant considerations, race, sex, or otherwise, was found to be both union and employer unfair labor practices.
The basis of the Board's rationale in its Miranda decision was its
theory that section 7 of the Act gives "employees the right to be free
from unfair or irrelevant or invidious treatment by their exclusive
bargaining agent in matters affecting their employment". 35 In effect,
the Board simply read into section 7 the union's section 9 duty to
represent all its members fairly and indiscriminately. Once this principle was established the Board's finding of the commission of an unfair labor practice by the union was largely a mechanical application
of the facts to 8(b)(1)(A) which proscribes a labor organization from
restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their section
7 rights. 36
37
The Board in Miranda also found the union in violation of 8(b)(2)
on the theory that it caused an employer to adversely affect the employment status of an employee and that such an effect was the foreseeable result of its conduct. The Board held that:
31. Id.
32. 140 N.L.R.B. at 181.
33. Id. at 185.
34. Id. at 186.
35. Id. at 185,
36. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970). Section 158 is commonly referred to as section 8.
Section 8(b)(l)(A) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-() to
restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
157 of this title ....
37. Id. § 158(b)(2) (1970). Section 8(b)(2) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ..... (2) to
cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) ....
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.A statutory bargaining representative and an employer . . . violate section 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3) when for arbitrary or irrelevant
reasons or upon the basis of unfair classification, the union attempts to cause or does cause an -employer to derogate the employment status of an employee.38
Thus, even where anemployer's conduct would not have been in violation of 8(a)(3) 39 had it acted alone, where a union causes an employer to adversely affect an employee's employment status for arbitrary
or irrelevant reasons, it has violated 8(b)(2) which proscribes a labor
organization from causing an employer to violate 8(a)(3). In other
words, when a union causes an employer to violate its (the union's)
duty of fair representation implicit in section 7, both are held to have
committed unfair labor practices. This. circuitous bit of reasoning to
find a union unfair labor practice seems a bit strained.
As indicated in the foregoing discussion, the Board in Miranda
also
40
found the employer in violation of both 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
The Board's, decision was based on a theory of derivative liability and
the employer's commission of an unfair. labor practice was completely
dependent upon the culpability of the union.4 1 Thus, the employer
was found to have violated 8(a)(1) 42 when it participated with the
union in reducing the -employee's seniority status, 43 an act already
found to have been a union unfair labor practice under 8(b)(1)(A).
And, as noted above, the employer was held to have violated 8(a)(3)
because the union caused it to affect the seniority status of an employee for arbitrary or irrelevant reasons, 44 an act in violation of the
union's duty of fair representation under section 7, but not independently of union conduct, an employer unfair labor practice. The significance of this aspect of the Miranda decision is that an employer, despite its lack of a statutory duty not to discriminate against employees
for arbitrary, irrelevant, or invidious reasons unrelated to their union
38. 140 N.L.R.B. at 186.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). Section 8(a)(3) provides:
(3) by discrimination in regard
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ....
to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization ....
40. 140 N.L.R.B. at 190.
41. Id. at 188.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970). Section 8(a)(1) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-) to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 . ...
43. 140 N.L.R.B. at 185-86.
44. Id. at 188.
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or concerted activities, was brought under section 8 of the Act and
subject to joint liability for a breach of union duty.
The Board's Miranda decision contained a vigorous dissent4 5 by
Members Fanning and McCulloch and was denied enforcement by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 46 The dissenting members of
the Board and Judge Medina, who wrote the majority opinion for the
Second Circuit, both expressly rejected the majority's section 747
8(b)(1)(A) theory.
The Miranda theory by its very nature lends itself to application in
cases of discrimination based on race, sex, or other clearly arbitrary
and irrelevant considerations and has been applied in subsequent
cases 48 dealing with discrimination of these types. Although the theory
has not been universally accepted by courts4 9 that have had the opportunity to rule on its validity, it is Board law and must be contended
with until expressly overruled either in each of the circuits or by the
Supreme Court.
One final point on Miranda should be stated here because of its
applicability to the material that follows, and that is simply that regardless of the status of the Miranda theory in terms of its validity, it
clearly stands only for the proposition that (1) a union commits an unfair labor practice when it treats its members in an arbitrary or irrelevant manner or classifies them based on unfair considerations, and (2)
an employer commits an unfair labor practice only when it acquiesces
to a request of a union and thus participates with the union in a discriminatory act. The employer's liability is therefore derivative of and
dependent upon the union's conduct. Nothing in Miranda is authority
for the proposition that an employer who engages in job discrimination without union participation has committed an independent employer unfair labor practice as proscribed by section 8(a) of the Act.
IV.

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AS AN EMPLOYER UNFAIR

LABOR PRACTICE: THE

Packinghouse APPROACH

The 1969 decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia in Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB 50 extended the Miranda
45. Id. at 191.
46. 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
47. Id. at 176-77.
48. See cases cited note 8 supra. See also Note, Raciallv Discriminatory Union Conduct:
Constitutional Commands For the NLRB, 56 IowA L. REv. 1044, 1049-53 (1971).
49. 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
50. 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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theory to an employer who, independently of a union, engages in
racially discriminatory conduct. The case came to the court on appeal
from a Board decision that the employer had violated 8(a)(5) 5' of the
Act by refusing to bargain with the union about allegedly racially
discriminatory practices. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia upheld the Board on its 8(a)(5) finding, but remanded the
case to the Board to determine whether the employer's policies or
practices invidiously discriminated against its employees on account of
their race. 52 In remanding the case to the Board, the court concluded
that such policies or practices violate 8(a)(1) of the Act because they
have the effect of interfering with an employee's section 7 rights by
inhibiting its "victims from asserting themselves against their employer
to improve their lot."'53 In this respect the court said:
We find that an employer's invidious discrimination on account of
race or national origin has such an effect. This effect is twofold:
(1) racial discrimination sets up an unjustified clash of interests
between groups of workers which tends to reduce the likelihood
and the effectiveness of their working in concert to achieve their
legitimate goals under the Act; and (2) racial discrimination creates
in its victims an apathy or docility which inhibits them from asserting their rights against the perpetrator of the discrimination.
We find that the confluence of these two factors sufficiently deters
the exercise of Section 7 rights as to violate Section 8(a)(1).54

Thus, for the first time an arbitrary or discriminatory practice by an
employer, not directly related to an employee's union or concerted
activities, was held to be an unfair labor practice. 55 Interesting enough,
the court did not hold that all unjustified discrimination is by itself
a violation of the Act. Rather, it based its decision on the fact that there
existed a combination of an unjustified or illegal racist practice coupled
with an induced docility in the group discriminated against. 56 Thus,
if the court is correct, it would seem that discrimination of the type
that resulted in the Miranda case5 7 may not be an 8(a)(1) violation
51. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970). Section 8(a)(5) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees ....
52. 416 F.2d at 1130.
53. ld. at 1135.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1138.
56. Id. at 1135.
57. 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963) (invidious discrimination in the administration of the
seniority provisions of the agreement). See text corresponding to notes 29-36,

Comments
where the employer acts alone, but that unjustified or illegal discrimination on account of race would always be an unfair labor practice since the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia expressly
held that racial discrimination has the effect of creating docility in the
group discriminated against5 The court's decision seems to indicate
that docility must be proven except where the discrimination alleged
is based on race or national origin.5 9
On remand the Board found that the evidence did not support a
finding that the employer had maintained policies and practices of
invidious racial discrimination and, therefore, it held there was no
violation of 8(a)(l). 60 Rejecting the trial examiner's recommendations,
the Board held that the General Counsel did not meet its burden of
establishing the existence of unlawful racial discrimination. 61
One interesting aspect of Packinghouse is that the underlying theory
was enunciated by the court in the context of a case which did not put
the issue of an 8(a)(1) violation squarely before it.62 Furthermore, the
recent decision in Jubilee Manufacturing Co.,63 makes it apparent that

the Board has elected not to adopt as Board law the theory on which
the decision was based.
V.

THE CURRENT APPROACH:

Jubilee ManufacturingCo.

Jubilee is a case recently decided by the NLRB which involved the
application of the legal theories enunciated in Miranda and Packinghouse to a situation involving alleged sex discrimination by an employer. 64 The questions presented to the Board by that case was whether
sex discrimination by an employer constituted a violation of 8(a)(1),
(3), and (5) of the Act.' 5
Jubilee Manufacturing Company and the United Steelworkers were
engaged in the negotiation of a new contract and had bargained to
impasse over the union's proposal to eliminate provisions in the collective bargaining agreement which enabled the employer to grant
wage increases on a unilateral basis. The contract between the parties
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
court
63.
64.
65.

416 F.2d at 1135-36.
Id.at I135.
Farmer's Cooperative Compress, 78 L.R.R.M. 1465, 1472 (1971).
Id. at 1468-69.
416 F.2d at 1134 n.12. The Board's Packinghouse decision was appealed to the
on an 8(a)(5) issue. See note 52 supra, and related textual material.
82 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1973).
Id. at 1484.
Id.
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also provided for a job classification and bidding system. Although
more than two-thirds of Jubilee's bargaining unit employees were
females, they were generally classified in the lower paying jobs, or
even where classified in the same jobs as male employees, received a
lower rate of pay. In prosecuting the case as a violation of section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act the General Counsel had alleged that a
combination of the employer's job classification and bidding systems
and its contractual right to unilaterally grant wage increases had the
effect of enabling the employer to pay wage rates on a sexually discriminatory basis. 68 The basis of the 8(a)(5) complaint was that the
employer had bargained to a point of impasse on its insistence on retaining this allegedly illegal contractual provision in the collective
67
bargaining agreement.
Expressing its disagreement with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Packinghouse,the Board rejected
the notion that discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a per se violation of 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act and
dismissed the complaint.68 Holding that such discrimination is not
"inherently destructive" of employee section 7 rights, the Board majority decided that actual, as opposed to speculative, evidence is necessary
to establish the required relationship between an employer's allegedly
discriminatory conduct and the interference with protected employee
rights.6 9 The Board also dismissed the 8(a)(5) charge on the basis that
the evidence was insufficient to establish that the employer had refused
70
to bargain about alleged sex discrimination.
The theory on which the 8(a)(1) issue was presented to the Board
was simply an extension of the Packinghouse decision of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia to a sex discrimination case.
Expressly rejecting the legal conclusion of that court, 71 the Board
reasoned that it is not an inevitable result that employer discrimination will have the effect of setting one group against another or otherwise inhibit minority employees from asserting their rights against the
employer-perpetrator of the discrimination. 72 Given the fact of increased militancy of minority groups today, the Board reasoned that
66.
67.

Id. at 1486-87 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1484.

68.

Id.

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id. at 1485.
Id. at 1484.
Id.

Comments
discrimination may, in fact, have just the opposite effect and cause
members of minority groups to coalesce and work together in concerted
73
activity against their employer's discriminatory practices.
This aspect of the Jubilee decision will undoubtedly be appealed by
the United Steelworkers, particularly since section 10(f) 74 of the Act
permits an aggrieved party to seek review of a Board decision by the
same court that decided Packinghouse and enunciated the law which
the Board has now rejected. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia would have to overrule Packinghouse to affirm
Jubilee and since there has been no significant change in the composition of that court nor any significant intervening developments in the
law that result seems unlikely. Consequently, because of the novelty
and importance of the question a Supreme Court test is a distinct
possibility.
The court could, of course, affirm in Jubilee without overruling
Packinghouse simply by distinguishing sex discrimination from that
based on race. Arguably, the court could decide that sex discrimination is not that type of invidious discrimination that automatically
creates the apathy or docility in the group discriminated against that
it had found inherent in a racial discrimination situation.7 5 There is
no question that sex discrimination is illegal, 76 but the basis of the
unfair labor practice in the court's Packinghouse decision was the
conjunction of the unreasonable and illegal discrimination with the
induced docility in the discriminated group. 77 In other words, it is a
combination of the two-an illegal act coupled with induced docility
-that makes out the violation of the Act. Distinguished in this manner, Packinghouseand Jubileecan be reconciled.
Although this approach may be well-founded in terms of traditional
attitudes of society which have historically attributed to members of
the Negro race a minority status, it is hardly consistent with the modern
tendency to attribute to females a similar minority status. Nor is it con73.

Id.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970). Section 160 is commonly known as section 10. Section 10(f)
provides:
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or
in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any United States court
of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged
to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts business, or in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such
court a written petition praying that the order of the Board be modified or set aside.
75. 416 F.2d at 1135.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
77. 416 F.2d at 1135.
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sistent with the modern trend of legislation, 78 executive announcement,7 9 and constitutional amendment"0 which represent a recognition
by the federal government of the female as a minority entitled to protections similar to that extended other minority groups. However,
these conditions look toward the legality of the discrimination, which
is only half of the Packinghouse requirement. The other critical element of the Packinghouse decision is based on the theory that racial
discrimination creates a docility among minority workers which causes
them to forego the pursuance of concerted activities guaranteed by
section 7. There is a firm basis for this reasoning because there is
sufficient historical evidence in society of a suppression of the Negro
race so as to allow the court to take judicial note of such facts.81 The
same reasoning is not applicable to discrimination based on sex because the traditional social concepts of race discrimination are not
available to the court. Sex discrimination may be proven by statistical
data under the applicable legal standards to be an illegal act,82 but
the concept is so new to society that it cannot be said that sex discrimination, per se, creates such a feeling of apathy and docility within a
female group that it would have the effect of inhibiting such employees
from engaging in concerted activities guaranteed by section 7. Thus,
the court could rationally hold that although, as found by the Board in
Jubilee, proof of a relationship between the alleged discriminatory
conduct and the intereference with employee rights is required in a
sex discrimination case, 3 such specific proof is not required to establish an 8(a)(1) violation grounded on racial discrimination.
The basis of the 8(a)(3) complaint in Jubilee was that the employer's
conduct had demonstrated to employees belonging to the union the
complete ineffectiveness of the bargaining representative thereby discouraging them from engaging in-union activity. 84 In effect, the Board
was being urged to establish an independent employer unfair labor
practice for the employer whose maintenance of a policy and practice
78. Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1963); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
79. Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (Comp. 1964-65); United States Dep't. of Labor
Rev. Order No. 4, 41 C.F.R. 60 (1971).
80. U.S. CONsT. amend. (proposed), adopted by Congress March 22, 1972, and submitted to legislatures of the states for ratification under U.S. CoNsr. art. v.
81. 416 F.2d at 1136-37.
82. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970). Although these are race discrimination cases, the principles are equally applicable to cases involving alleged sex discrimination.
83. 82 L.R.R.M. at 1484.
84. Id.
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of discrimination in the face of resistance by the union to eliminate
such practices pursuant to its obligation of fair representation of its
members, demonstrated to unit employees the union's ineffectiveness
in dealing with its statutory obligations.8 5 Implicit in this theory was
the suggestion that the employer's acts would have the foreseeable consequences of discouraging employee support of the union and thus have
the effect of discouraging membership in the union in violation of
8(a)(3). 8 0 In rejecting this theory the Board said:
Nor do we find merit in the contention that a policy and practice of invidious discrimination in the face of a union's ineffective
efforts to eliminate such discrimination has the 'foreseeable consequence' of discouraging union membership within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, and discouraging the exercise of Section 7 rights within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Ineffective efforts in other areas, as for example when a union
seeks unsuccessfully to gain a wage increase, may well result in the
union's losing face with the employees it represents. Yet, to say
that an employer's refusal to give a wage increase violates Section
of face seems to us beyond the
8(a)(3) or (1) because of this loss
87
reasonable intent of the Statute.

The decision of the Board on the 8(a)(3) issue is sound as the General Counsel's theory on this point was based on neither logic nor
precedent. Never before has the Board held that an employer's discriminatory conduct alone, unrelated to union or concerted activities, is
proscribed by 8(a)(3). The premise of the General Counsel's position
would appear to have been grounded on Miranda principles but
clearly represents a definite extension thereof. In Miranda, the court
held that arbitrary or irrelevant classifications of employees tends to
discourage union membership and found that participation by the
employer in the union's unfair labor practice was an employer unfair
labor practice as well. 88 In Jubilee, however, it was argued that the
Board should find an 8(a)(3) violation without union participation, 9
a concept which derives no authority from Miranda nor any other
known legal precedent. Furthermore, since the Miranda theory is of
dubious validity itself, particularly when considered in light of the
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 140 N.L.R.B. at 185-86.
89. BNA DAILY LAB. REP. No. 85, at A-16 (1972).
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Second Circuit's refusal to enforce it,9° it would appear that the Board
was correct and this position, if advanced on appeal, will not stand
the test of court scrutiny.
Nor was the General Counsel's argument to the Board based on
sound labor relations logic. As pointed out by the Board, it is apparent
that the same effect-that of demonstrating to unit members the ineffectiveness of the union-would occur any time that an employer refuses to acquiesce to a union demand. 91 There is, of course, no reason
why the refusal to concede to a union demand in a matter involving
discrimination, absent anti-union motives, would discourage union
membership any more than would its refusal to grant a wage increase
or other benefit demanded by the union. Clearly, an employer's denial
of the latter benefit would not violate 8(a)(3) even though it may also
demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the union and thus discourage union
membership. It is just as clear that neither should the employer's refusal to acquiesce to a union's demand on the subject matter of dis92
crimination violate 8(a)(3) of the Act.
Jubilee was also charged with a violation of 8(a)(5) on the theory
that it had bargained to impasse on a contract provision which was the
tool by which it could operate in a sexually discriminatory manner,
thereby attempting to force the union to become a party to an agreement which violated its duty of fair representation. 93 It was also contended that the employer, by insisting upon the maintenance of the
contractual provision by which it had the authority to perpetuate sex
discrimination, had bargained to impasse upon a subject which is illegal
under federal law and is therefore an illegal subject of bargaining.H
According to the General Counsel, there was sufficient statistical evidence to support a finding of sex discrimination according to Title VII
standards and the employer had not come forward to justify its invidious practices. 95 In short, it wag argued that the Board should apply
the standards of other federal laws-in this case Title VI1 9 --- to make
the initial finding of illegality, apply that finding to the facts of this
case, and on the principle of well-settled law that a party is not required
90.
91.
92.
supra.
93.
94.

326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
82 L.R.R.M. at 1484.
Id. See quoted portion of Board's decision in textual material related to note 87
BNA DAILY LAB. REP. No. 85, at A-16 (1972).
Id. at A-17.

95. Id. at A-16 to -17.
96. The spme argument could also be made with respect to the Equal Pay Act of 1963,
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1963).
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to bargain on an illegal subject, conclude that the employer had refused to bargain in good faith in violation of 8(a)(5) of the Act.
The argument advanced by the General Counsel represents a rather
novel approach to a refusal to bargain question. The Board neatly
sidestepped the issue by concluding that there was insufficient evidence
to establish that this employer had refused to bargain over alleged sex
discrimination, and further, that it was the union's conduct that had
prevented meaningful bargaining on that subject.9 7 Since the Board's
conclusion on this point was a determination of fact and therefore will
not likely be disturbed on appeal, 98 the question whether the standards of other federal laws are available to the Board to determine the
legality of a bargaining subject has been left open by the Board. 99
The Board's decision in Jubilee has significantly limited its antidiscrimination potential and has reversed the trend of those decisions
that had established the Act as a vehicle for eliminating discrimination
in employment. 10 0 Given the state of the law's development and the
availability of the Packinghouse court as a forum for appeal, Jubilee
in all probability will be reversed. Should this occur the Supreme
Court may have to decide the extent to which the Board has jurisdiction over conduct that has been expressly proscribed by Title VII.
VI.

THE JURISDICTION OF THE BOARD

In Packinghouse, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
citing the legislative history of the Act, expressly ruled that Title VII
did not deprive the Board of jurisdiction in racial discrimination cases
and held that the Board has concurrent jurisdiction with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 10 The legislative history is not as clear on that point as the court would suggest. A close analy97. 82 L.R.R.M. at 1485.
98. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970). Section 10(e) provides:
The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive.
99. It is clear that an employer who bargains to impasse on an illegal subject of
bargaining commits an unfair labor practice under this Act. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U.S. 342 (1958). It is equally clear that a proposal which on its face discriminates
against employees because of their race or sex is an illegal subject of bargaining. Hughes
Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964). It is not so clear, however, to what extent a contractual provision, non-discriminatory on its face but discriminatory either in effect or
application, is an illegal clause within the scope of the bargaining duty. The answer to
that question may depend upon whether the standards of Title VII are available to determine the legality of the conduct.
100. 82 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1973).
101. 416F.2dat 1133n.11.
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sis of the applicable history would seem to indicate that Congress did not
intend that Title VII should preempt the Board from jurisdiction
over any subject matter that it exercised at the time, but there is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that Congress foresaw an expansion of the Board's civil rights activity into new areas. 10 2 Therefore,
since the scope of the Board involvement in discrimination cases at
the time Title VII was being debated in Congress was primarily
limited to cases involving a union's breach of its section 9 duty of fair
representation, 103 it is more logical to conclude that Congress intended
that the Board and the EEOC should exercise concurrent jurisdiction
only in the limited area which the Board had already extended its
jurisdiction.1 0 4 This is an especially forceful argument when considered
in light of the fact that Congress has rejected amendments to the Act
which would expressly make racial discrimination an unfair labor
practice for both employers and unions. 0 5
The conclusion that the passage of Title VII precludes the Board
from asserting jurisdiction over matters expressly prohibited by that
statute becomes even more apparent when its statutory language is
compared with that of the Act. Section 703(a) 10 6 of Title VII, which
deals with unlawful employment practices for an employer, and section 703(c), 10 7 which imposes corresponding obligations on labor
102. Note, Allocating Jurisdiction Over Racial Issues Between the EEOC and NLRB:
A Proposal,54 CORNELL L. R.v. 943, 954 n.65 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Racial Issues].
103. Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v Hoffman,
345 U.S. 330 (1953); Wall Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
104. See Racial Issues, note 102 supra. A Department of Justice letter to Senator Joseph
S. Clark, presented during the Congressional debates, supports this view. The letter stated
in part:
. . . [I]f a given action should violate both Title VII and the National Labor Relatio:ts Act, the National Labor Relations Board would not be deprived of jurisdiction
Title...VII would have no effect on the duties of any employer or labor organization under the NLRA or under the Railway Labor Act, and these duties would continue to be enforced as they are now....
110 CONG. REc. 7207 (1964).
105. See RacialIssues, note 102 supra.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
107. Id. § 2000e-4 provides:
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization . . . (1) to
exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; (2) to limit, seg-
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unions, are both couched in terms very similar to section 8 language
of the Act. 0 8 This is particularly the case with section 703(c)(1) and
(3) which clearly expands on the prohibitions of sections 8 (b)(1)(A) 109
and 8(b)(2)"10 by expressly referring to discrimination on account of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin. The conclusion is inescapable that Congress did not believe that discrimination on the arbitrary grounds enumerated was already proscribed by the Act and within
the jurisdiction of the Board.
It is also significant that Congress did not grant enforcement powers
to either the EEOC or the Board when it enacted Title VII."' Although one may argue that Congress did not need to grant the Board
power to enforce Title VII since it already had jurisdiction over similar
matters by virtue of the Act, the more logical conclusion is that Congress, mindful of the national policy of a uniform system of labor regulation as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Building Trades Council
v. Garmon,"2 intended to maintain separate the invidious types of
discrimination prohibited by Title VII from those related to union or
concerted activity which were already proscribed by the Act. In Garmon
the Court established the "preemption doctrine" for the Act. It there
held that state and federal courts must defer to the competence of the
Board in any matters which are arguably subject to sections 7 and 8 of
the Act."' Congress was certainly aware of the preemption doctrine
when it decided that state remedies must be exhausted before any
action can be brought under Title VII," 4 and further, that federal
district courts would have original jurisdiction of actions brought
under that statute. 11 It would hardly be consistent with Garmon for
Congress to have enacted a legislative scheme that would create conregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or fail to refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin; or (3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of this section.
108. Note, Labor Law: Applicability of Unfair Labor Practices to Racial Discrimination: Enforcement Under Civil Rights Act-Independent Metal Workers, 50 CORNELL L.
REv. 321, 327-28 (1965).

109.
110.

29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970).
Id. § 158(b)(2).

111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(F) (1970). Congress may have believed that the Board did not
have the expertise to handle this type of discrimination complaint. See note 108 supra.
112. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
113. Id. at 245.

114.
115.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970).
Id. § 2000e-5(f).
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current jurisdiction by the courts and the Board over matters already
prohibited by the Act. 116 Consequently, it must have believed that invidious discrimination of the type proscribed by Title VII was not
arguably within the protection of that Act. Again, the conclusion is
inescapable that Congress, in providing for court enforcement of Title
VII, was of the opinion that the Board did not possess jurisdiction over
racial and other similar types of prohibited discrimination.
The comparative language of these two statutes, the legislative history of Title VII and consistency with the national labor policy, all
lead to the conclusion that Title VII should preempt the Board of
jurisdiction in race discrimination cases, especially in those that are
based on Miranda and Packinghouse theories. Some writers, however
have argued for an allocation of jurisdiction between the EEOC and
Board which would, in effect, give the EEOC primary jurisdiction over
all racial discrimination matters and the Board overlapping jurisdiction with the EEOC only in racial issues connected with some other
independent exercise of its jurisdiction. 117 If the Board is to have jurisdiction at all this would appear to be the most satisfactory accommodation consistent with the purposes of the two statutes. Regardless of
allocation, however, it is clear that the cases, even prior to Jubilee,
expanded Board jurisdiction into racial discrimination matters only
insofar as patterns or practices"" of invidious discrimination are apparent, and the courts have not, as yet, considered a single act of discrimination an employer unfair labor practice. Consequently, since the
reasoning of Miranda and Packinghouse is not conducive to an examination of isolated discriminatory acts, it is likely that the EEOC under
Title VII will retain exclusive jurisdiction in this area even if Jubilee
is reversed and the Board is given jurisdiction over racial or other
prohibited forms of discrimination by an employer.
VII.

THE APPLICATION

OF

TITLE

VII

STANDARDS

LABOR PRACTICES UNDER THE

TO

UNFAIR

ACT

It was previously noted that the Board's Jubilee decision will likely
be reversed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. As116. For an opposing view of the effect of the preemption doctrine on the jurisdiction
of the Board in discrimination cases that could be brought under Titie VII, see Sovern,
supra note 22, at 595 n.610.
117. See Racial Issues, supra note 102, at 951.
118. 416 F.2d at 1130. See also Leiken, supra note 7, at 866.
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suming that event occurs and, further, that the Board accepts the conclusion of that court as Board law and asserts jurisdiction over matters
dealing with invidious discrimination, it is then faced with the problem of adopting a standard by which it can determine whether discrimination exists. This, of course, raises the question as to how the
civil rights potential of the Act can square with Title VII. Just as was
the case in Packinghouse, where the Board on remand found that the
employer did not engage in invidious discrimination, the initial question that the Board should ordinarily consider in any case based on
such discrimination before it can address itself tO the unfair labor practice issues, is whether the employer did, in fact, discriminate against
its employees for one of the published reasons.
The position of the General Counsel in Jubilee was that the Board
should adopt the standards of other federal laws 119 to decide the issue
of sex discrimination, and then apply Board law to the 8(a)(1), (3),
and (5) unfair labor practice issues. Under Title VII, an employment
practice is unlawful if it adversely affects a disproportionate number
of persons in a protected class regardless of the employer's motive or
intent. 120 The Supreme Court has held that Title VII is directed at the
consequences of employment practices and that good intent, or absence
of discriminatory intent, does not redeem employment practices which
operate to discriminate against minorities.' 21 In other words, an employment practice, lawful on its face but discriminatory in effect, violates Title VII regardless of the employer's motivation unless the employer can carry the burden of proving a legitimate business necessity
which outweighs the discriminatory effects of the practice.122 Therefore, any practice that can be statistically 23 shown to have an adverse
affect on a protected grcup, presumptively violates Title VII, and, if
the General Counsel's Jubilee.theories prevail, is an unfair labor practice as well.
The Board expressly rejected this theory in the context of its 8(a)(1)
decision in Packinghouse. In rejecting the trial examiner's conclusion
that the statistical evidence established the fact of racial discrimina119. Seenote 89supra.
120. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 849 (1971); see Note, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964-Educationaland Testing Requirements Invalid Unless Job Related,
10 DuQ. L. REv. 270-72 (1971); Note, Arrest Records and Employment Discrimination,
Gregory v. Litton Industries,Inc., 32 U. Prrr. L. REv. 254-56 (1971).
121 401 U.S. at 432.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 430-32.
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tion, the majority there held that "numerical possibilities" do not
establish that the employer "deliberately discriminated in the assignment or distribution of these jobs on the basis of race or national
origin rather than on the basis of qualifications". 124 Packinghouse was
not subsequently appealed on the basis that the Board applied an improper legal standard in deciding the case, and there is absolutely no
judicial authority for the proposition that Title VII standards are
applicable to an 8(a)(1) issue grounded on discrimination of the type
prohibited by that Act. For the same reasons discussed in the section
of this comment dealing with Congressional intent in enacting two
statutes to deal with two distinct problems, 12 5 the adoption of this
theory is a rather remote prospect. Therefore, since motivation and
intent have historically been considered of greater relevance in 8(a)(3)
cases than in 8(a)(1) cases, 126 it is even more improbable that Title VII
standards will be adopted to decide 8(a)(3) cases involving racial or
sexual discrimination issues. Consequently, an identical issue involving
a question as to the existence of discriminationwhich is decided concurrently by the Board and EEOC, may well end up with results that
could create inconsistent means of conduct for an employer.
The foregoing analysis deals primarily with the legal standards applicable to an action brought concurrently under the Act and Title VII
to determine the fact of racial discrimination. Motivation and intent
are also of primary importance in determining whether an 8(a)(3) unfair labor practice has been committed even after the factual determina1 27
tion has been made.
The essential elements of an 8(a)(3) unfair labor practice are (1)
proof that an employer's conduct favored one group or groups of employees over others in a manner which tended to encourage or discourage their membership in a union, and (2) proof that the employer's
conduct was motivated by an intent to affect union membership.12 8
Thus, in a race discrimination case brought under the Act motive is
of two-fold importance. In order to find discrimination under the first
element, it must be shown that the employer intended to favor one
group of employees over another because of their race. Assuming that
124.

78 L.R.R.M. at 1472.

125. See textual material related to notes 108-18 supra.
126. Janofsky, New Concepts in Interference and Discrimination under the NLRA:
The Legacy of American Shipbuilding and Great Dane Trailers, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 81,

94-96 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Janofsky].
127. Id.
128. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 32 (1967).
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the first element is proven, then it must be shown that the employer's
discriminatory conduct was motivated by an intent to encourage or
discourage union membership. As distinguished from that approach a
violation of section 703 of Title VII occurs when the effect of an employer's act is to favor one group of employees over a protected group
129
of employees without regard to the motivation of the employer.
Stated concisely, in an 8(a)(3) action the burden of proof is on the
Board, 130 while under Title VII the burden rests with the employer.' 3 '
Although the differences in legal standards of a Title VII action and
one under section 8 of the Act are apparent on their face, when applied
to a racial or sexual discrimination issue and considered in light of the
present status of the law in regard to motivation and burden of proof
in 8(a)(3) cases as hereinafter discussed, they may represent differences
without a significant distinction.
In NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.,13 2 the Supreme Court analyzed the status of the law relative to motive and burden of proof in
33
8(a)(3) cases. Citing its decisions in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,1
NLRB v. Brown, 13 4 and NLRB v. American Ship Building Co.,13 5 the
Court noted that it had distinguished between employer conduct that
is "inherently destructive' '1 36 of employee rights and that which has
only a "comparatively slight"'137 effect on employee rights. In the
former, the Court held that the conduct bears "its own indicia of intent" and is proscribed without proof of an underlying motive' 38
despite evidence of business justification by the employer. 3 9 In the
latter, however, proof of a substantial and legitimate business end by
the employer overcomes employer conduct which has a comparatively
slight effect on employee rights and improper motivation must be
affirmatively proven. 40 Noting these decisions the Court held in Great
Dane that once the Board has proven that an employer has engaged in
discriminatory conduct which has some adverse effect on employee
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 849 (1971).
See Janofsky, supra note 126, at 95.
401 U.S. at 849.
388 U.S. 26 (1967).
373 U.S. 221 (1963).
380 U.S. 278 (1965).
Id. at 300.
Id. at 287, 311.
Id. at 289, 311-13.
373 U.S. at 228, 231.
139. Id. at 229.
140. 380 U.S. at 289, 311-13.
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rights, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show that his con141
duct was lawfully motivated and served substantial business ends.
Applying these principles to an 8(a)(3) charge alleging discrimination
on account of race, it would appear that any evidence of racial discrimination would be enough to shift the burden of proof to the employer to show business justification for its conduct. 142 The Supreme
Court has held that racial discrimination can never be a relevant consideration. 43 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that such discriminatory conduct by an employer is of the type that is inherently
destructive of employee rights. 144 Since racial discrimination is inherently destructive of employee rights the motivation for the conduct
is presumed unlawful and the employer thus has the burden of overcoming that presumption with evidence of substantial business justification such as will outweigh the discriminatory effect of the conduct.
Unlawful motive thus being presumed the employer's conduct is therefore subject to a burden of proof which in all important respects
equates that of a Title VII action. Under this rationale it matters
little whether the action was brought under the Act or under Title VII.
In either case, the burden is on the employer to offer evidence of a substantial and legitimate business need that would outweigh the discriminatory effect of its conduct.
Consideration of the question in terms of the 8(a)(5) issue presents
an altogether different matter. There the issue is not so much as to
whether the employer was motivated by union animus as it is whether
the matter on which it has bargained to impasse is an illegal subject of
bargaining. Here the ultimate question is one of legality rather than
one of intent, even though intent may be an important element in
determining the legality of the conduct.
Most of the cases that have dealt with illegal subjects of bargaining
have involved matters which were illegal1 45 under the Act or else*were
inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. 146 In United Mine Workers
141. 388 U.S. at 34.
142. Id.
143. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
144. The Board in jubilee decided that sex discrimination was not inherently destructive of employee rights. 82 L.R.R.M. at 1484.
145. NLRB v. National Maritime Union, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 954 (1950); Penello v. United Mine Workers, 88 F. Supp. 935 (D.D.C. 1950); Amalgamated Lithographers Local 17, 150 N.L.R.B. 985 (1961).
146. NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961); Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v.
NLRB, 360 F.2d 19 (4th Cir. 1966); Gay Paree Undergarment Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 1363 (1950).
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v. Pennington,'1 47 however, the Supreme Court held that a union's
agreement with one employer which imposed wage scales on another
was not exempt from the federal antitrust laws. 148 Implicit in the
Court's decision is that a violation of that statute would frustrate na149
tional labor policy and constitute an illegal subject of bargaining.
The Pennington rationale may well be applicable to the 8(a)(5) question raised' but not answered in Jubilee.150 Certainly, had an action
been brought under Title VII in the first instance with a finding by
the EEOC that the employers had engaged in invidious sex discrimination, the Board would recognize that decision as a conclusive finding
that the subject matter on which the employer bargained to impasse
was illegal. Therefore, there seems to be no reason, especially in light
of Pennington, why the Board should not, in the first instance, determine the legality of the matter by the application of Title VII
standards.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Prior to the recent Jubilee decision the Act, by virtue of the Miranda
and Packinghousedecisions, was potentially available as a tool for eliminating employer job discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. The rationale of these decisions would
appear to have been influenced by the social climate of the day and had
resulted in an extension of the Act into an area that is not consistent
with its basic purposes.' 51 Neither the legislative history 52 of the Act
53 supnor thirty years of administrative and judicial interpretation
port the Mirandaand Packinghouse theories as applied to an employer.
Even assuming the validity of the Miranda theory that a union's section 9 duty of fair representation is implicit in section 7, and a breach
of that duty is therefore a basis for a union unfair labor practice, 54 it
takes a strained application of that theory to find a basis for an employer unfair labor practice grounded on racial or other similar forms
of discriminatory conduct.
147. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
148. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7,
149. 381 U.S. at 664-67.
150. 82 L.R.R.M. at 1485.
151. 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1947).
152. Racial Issues, supra note 102,
153. See textual material related to
154. See textual material related to

12-27 (1964).

at 954 n.65.
notes 15-28 supra.
notes 35-36 supra.
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Assuming arguendo, however, that Jubilee is reversed and the unfair
labor practice theories advanced are in that case eventually upheld by
the Supreme Court thereby confirming the Board's jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the Board should decline to exercise that jurisdiction except in matters that raise issues peculiarly within its statutory
province. 155 The Board should defer to the greater expertise of the
EEOC in deciding issues of discrimination because of race, color, sex,
religion or national origin, and should consider allegations of discrimination only to the extent that the discrimination issues are connected
with some other independent exercise of its jurisdiction. 58 Furthermore, since the Board should handle discrimination issues only in a
collateral sense, it is submitted that a determination by the EEOC as
to the existence of discrimination by an employer should be binding
on the Board when it exercises its jurisdiction in the suggested limited
fashion.
Even where the Board does operate within this limited jurisdiction
it will sometime be necessary for it to decide whether an employer has
engaged in discriminatory conduct. 57 In such cases, the Board should
not adopt the standards of other federal laws to determine the existence
of discrimination as urged by Jenkins dissent in Packinghouse55 and
the United Steelworkers Union in Jubilee,159 except in 8(a)(5) cases
where the issue is whether the employer has bargained to impasse on
an illegal subject. Under the latter circumstances it would seem logi80
cal, as was implicit in the Supreme Court decision in Pennington,'
that the legality of the employer's conduct ought to be determined by
the standards of the statute that made the conduct illegal.
Jubilee represents a significant development in the growing body of
law involving an employer's duty not to discriminate against its employees because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
The Board reversed the trend of the developing case law that had
established the Act as an anti-discrimination statute by rejecting the
155. Racial Issues, supra note 102, at 956-57.
156. Id. at 950.
157. Jubilee did not oust the Board of jurisdiction in all cases involving discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. The Board will continue to
consider whether such acts of discrimination violate sections 8(a)(l), (3), and (5) when
there is actual evidence of a direct relationship between the alleged discrimination and
the Board's traditional and primary functions of fostering collective bargaining, protecting
employee rights and conducting representation elections. 82 L.R.R.M. at 1484.
158. 78 L.R.R.M. at 1473.
159. See note 89 supra.
160. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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legal conclusion of the Packinghouse court that an employer's policies
and practices of such forms of discrimination are a per se violation of
section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 161 Should the Jubilee decision be appealed
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, as it undoubtedly
will be, 1 62 that court should overrule its Packinghouse decision and
affirm Jubilee as being more consistent with the central purposes of
the Act to foster collective bargaining, protect employee rights and
conduct representation elections. 1 63 Congress has enacted Title VII to
rectify the social injustices at which the Packinghouse decision was
directed. The Board has finally recognized that fact. It is time for the
court to do likewise.
FRED W. VEIL
161.
162.

See textual material relating to notes 71-73 supra.
See textual material relating to notes 74-83 supra.

163.

82 L.R.R.M. at 1484.

